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Laetitia Graslin, Université de Lorraine.
Historians  have  found  the  possibility  to  use  models  coming  from  other  academic  fields
appealing yet risky. The end of 19th  century has been a time of opposing views in ancient economic
history between the supporters of Mahler and Buchner1. This wrangling has impacted ancient economic
history for a long time, leading to a gap between so-called primitivists and modernists. It is now-a-days
well-known that  this  debate often lead to  theoretical  dead ends.  But  at  least,  it  help to  reveal  the
problem of models use in history. Because of those long years of sterile debates, some scholars are still
reluctant to use theoretical models. But an increasing number of historians are becoming aware of the
usefullness of such models to help understand ancient evidence. The problem remains for historians to
choose which model  could be relevant  for their  studies.  Those inspired by M. Weber, K. Marx or
K. Polanyi2 have often been used in ancient history, but their limitations have since become apparent.
Research is currently exploring new paths : observation of ancient evidence leads historians to focus on
the issue of economic growth, technological progress, or demographic expansion3. They also deal with
the issue of economic change and of the factors which enable or obstruct this change. .  Those new
questions show a need for new theoretical background. 
Current research in economic sciences commonly uses the so-called neo-classical model. This
theoretical framework brought to modern economic research a rigorous modelling, which appears to be
very efficient to provide easy and clear explanations of modern world. According to classical economic
theory,  economic  choices  are  supposed  to  be  the  result  of  an  arbitration  made  by  fully  rational
individuals:  neo-classical  homo  economicus preferences  are  rational  and  can  be  identified  and
1 On the use of economic models in ancient history, see the introduction of (Scheidel, Morris, Saller, & more, 2013). On 
the same subject in Assyriology, see (Laetitia Graslin-Thomé, 2009, pp. 91–181). 
2 (Polanyi, 1977). For a more or less critical use of Polanyi's thesis in Assyriology, see (Renger, 1984) (Clancier, 
Rouillard, & Tenu, 2005).
3 It is the core of books like (Scheidel et al., 2013) or (Jursa, 2010).
classified. To achieve his preferences, the neo-classical homo-economicus would make the best use of
an information supposed to be comprehensive and relevant4. Unfortunatly this assumption, which has
been conveniEnt to elaborate economic studies related to modern worlds, is, from a historian's point of
view, far too unrealistic when applied to ancient times. This explains why historians have recently
turned to NIE5 : this branch of economic research refutes the assumption of perfect rationality, and
explores the consequences of a bounded rationality, in order to provide an accurate description of actual
human behavior. Another point of mutual interest among economists related to NIE is their interest for
institutions  and different  kinds  of organizations  that  structure economic life.  Some NIE economist
advocate that those organizations and institutions6 might have been responsible for economic change.
This goes well with current questionning of historians, dealing with economic change and conditions of
economic growth. This article will revisit different aspects of what NIE theories could offer to the field
of ancient studies, by giving concrete examples from ancient Babylonia.
Indeed, the focus put on NIE in ancient history gave a new place to the ancient Orient in ancient
economic history. Assyriology has not played a major role in the XIX th  century debates between so-
called primitivists and modernists. Those debates arose at  a time when Assyriology was still  in its
infancy,  when  discovering  and  editing  texts  was  the  primary  goal,  and  Assyriologists  have  been
reluctant to take part in theoretical debates in the past7. Things have since changed, and more studies in
Assyriology have made references to theoretical models8. The entrance of oriental studies in the debate
on NIE is even more relevant now that ancient Near East provides textual evidence which suits with the
kind of reasoning advocated by the NIE. For example, NIE explores individual behavior and the way
official  or  nonofficial  institutions  determine  economic  choices.  It  also  stresses  the  importance  of
organizations  in  organizing,  and  sometime  obstructing  economic  life.  Evidence  from  ancient
Mesopotamia often gives clue to allow us to answer these kinds of questions. In this part of the ancient
world, since the development of writing towards the end of 4th  millennium BC, texts related to every
aspect of human life are numerous. The clay tablets, on which scripts were written, were well-preseved
4 See, for example, (Durlauf & Blume, 2008).
5 See, recently, (Bresson, 2009) (Bresson, 2009). See also (Scheidel et al., 2013) and the critical review of this book, in 
(Bang, 2009) or Topoi 17, 2011. For other attempts to find new theoritical models, see, for example (Archibald, Davies, 
& Gabrielsen, 2005) (Fibiger Bang, Ikeguchi, & Ziche, 2006).
6 The difference between institutions and organization has been coined by D. North (Richter, 2005).
7 (Laetitia Graslin-Thomé, 2009). 
8 See, for example, (Jursa, 2010) for first millennium Mesopotamia.
by the climate in  Mesopotamia,  resulting in  the preservation of thousands of documents9.  Ancient
Mesopotamian  tablets  provide  details  in  different  aspects  of  economic  life,  to  varying  degrees
according to times and places. We have both the juridical texts which show what NIE calls the rules of
the game, and the all-day testimony, which sometimes helps historians to see the discrepancy between
how things should have been and how things actually happened.  
This article will focus on Babylonia in 6th century B.C., which seems to be a suitable time
period to test NIE efficiency in ancient history. First of all, it is one of the best documented places in
antiquity. M. Jursa, in his recent book on Babylonian economy, estimated there to be 19,000 published
texts,  with  many more  to  be published10.   Most  of  them come from main  Babylonian  temples  or
originate  from private  archives.  There  is  another  reason to  take  a  special  interest  in  this  period  –
M. Jursa’s recent  book showed that  is  has  been a  time of  economic  change:  tablets  showing new
economic behavior, surveys11 highlight demographic growth, which may have been accompanied by
economic growth. Nevertheless, 6th century Babylonia did not remain in history as the starting point of
a  significant  economic  renewal,  while  economic  changes  definitely   occurred,  they  were  not  as
significantly as they could have been. In this matter, Babylonia appears to be a case study of what NIE
tries to explain: what drives the economic changes, and at the same level, what prevents economic
change from occurring.
However, to be efficient, the use of NIE must not be too generalised. Several approaches are
gathered under the same common banner of “NIE12“. Theories of the firm13, of transaction costs14, or of
historical  change15 are  several  facets of this  common school  of thought.  This  article will  pick and
choose  from  these  different  NIE  theories,  looking  for  the  elements  that  could  help  historians  to
understand 6th century Babylonia. 
From an economist’s point of view, the main theoretical achievement of NIE is the concept of
transaction cost. It originates from Ronald Coase’s16 article on the firm, but its main theoretician is
9 For an introduction to ancient mesopotamian history, see (Radner & Robson, 2011). For and introduction on first 
millennium mesopotamian history, see (Joannès, 2004).
10 (Jursa, 2005) (Jursa, 2010).
11 (Adams, 1981).
12 On NIE in general, see (Richter, 2005) (Chavance, 2012)
13 (Williamson, 1985).
14 (Williamson, 1981).
15 (North, 1981) (North & Thomas, 1995).
16 (Coase, 1937). See also (Coase, 1998).
Williamson.  Transaction  costs  include,  besides  the  prices,  all  the costs  occurring  during  economic
exchange: it includes search and information costs, related to the necessity to determine which goods
are present in the market and at which price. Bargaining costs are included as well: they are the cost
required to elaborate an appropriate contract between parties involved in the transaction. The costs
related to the risk involved in the exchange are very important as well. Those transaction costs are not
commonly  taken  into  account  by  neo-classical  theory  where  prices  are  supposed  to  be  simply
determined by interaction between market supply and demand: it is the famous “invisible hand of the
market”.  But  in  real  life,  and  furthermore  in  antiquity,  transaction  costs  are  not  to  be  neglected.
Commonly, they are too high to facilitate a successful transaction. A wealthy landlord will not loan his
money to an investor, because he does not know where to lodge a claim if he does not get his money
back.  A merchant  will  not  travel  abroad  to  bring  back  luxury  goods  because  travel  costs  are
discouragingly high. A craftsman will not produce this beautiful artifact because he does not know how
to locate a potential buyer. If transaction costs are lowered, all those transactions would have become
possible. It was a new trading network which was becoming established. Hence, even if Williamson
didn't  write  about  this  topic,  transaction  costs  can  play  an  important  role  in  economic  change
throughout history. 
The emphasis placed by Williamson on transaction costs draws the attention of Assyriologists,
because Neo-Babylonians documents give a significant amount of information on transaction costs. In
antiquity, high transportation costs form a significant part of transaction costs . 6 th century Babylonia is
a disparate area where some goods exchanges were simple and cheap, while others were much more
costly. The transport costs in this time period have recently been estimated at up to 20% of the load
value for local trade17. One can imagine that they are even higher for long distance trade, especially as
the costs related to the travel risks are to be taken into account as well. In one text18, for example,
agents from the Sippar temple were commissioned to gather wood in Lebanon. From the record of that
was given to them for the trip, we learn that the agents required shoes, travel goods and even archers
for protection. In this context of very high transport costs, only valuable goods were being moved.
There is no noteworthy change in the 6th  century compared to earlier periods. A few lists of imported
goods date from this time19: they are more or less the same as in previous centuries. Technical progress
17 Weszeli, in (Jursa, 2010, p. 151).
18 (Bongenaar, 1997, pp. 392–395).
19 Dyes, wood, wine, metals, honey. For references of the texts, see (Oppenheim, 1969) and (Laetitia Graslin-Thomé, 
was limited, even if some roads were being built, mainly for military purpose but benefited travelers as
well. 
One significant technical progress nevertheless has been the domestication of camel and its
increasing use for carrying goods through the deserts20. The first textual evidence of camels being used
in long distance trade dates back to the middle of the 8 th  century BC, in an inscription written by
Ninurta-Kudurri-Usur, a local baron. The inscription boasts of having stopped a convoy of camels
carrying exotics products21.  The shipments carried by camels were much more significant than the
smaller ones carried by donkeys in previous periods. Later, in the roman period, the domestication of
camel allowed trade from Arabia to flourish. Paradoxically, there is no mention of camels in Neo-
Babylonian texts. It seems that the owners of the Babylonian archives did not take part in this emergent
and promising long distance trade22. We will have to go back to this paradox later.  
Williamson's main conclusion is  that transaction costs cannot be reduced to transport  costs.
Sixth century Babylonia faced several transformations which reduced transaction costs. As an example,
the existence of a simplified system of weight and measurement was a significant development 23. In
Neo-Assyrian texts, the measurement of weight still lacks standardization, leading to a great deal of
difficulties and errors,  be they intentional or not24.  In Neo-Babylonian texts, the system was much
simpler. Nevertheless, heterogeneity remained a reality and the multiplicity of terms used to define the
quality of silver25 was significant: silver was defined as peşu, nuhhutu,  šibirtu,  ša ginnu as example.
The  risks  associated  with  fraud  on  the  quality  of  metal  remained  a  problem26.  The  concrete
2009, pp. 27–55). See for IIe mill (Faist, 2001)..
20 (Jasmin, 2005). The oldest bone remains which could be related with camel domestication date back to IIIe millennium
in the Yemen. In Mesopotamia, the first picture of a domesticated camel is to be found on the obelisk of Aššur-Bel-
Kala, son of Tukulti-Ninurta Ier, and dates back to 1100 BC. The middle-Euphrats town of Hindanu gave dromedaries
as a tribute to Tukulti-Ninurta II (890-884). But domestic camel were not in common use before the VIIIth century BC in
Mesopotamia and Levante.  
21 RIMB II S.0.1002.3, in (Grayson, 1991). See also (Liverani, 1992) and (Laetitia Graslin-Thomé, 2009, p. 75).
22 This Arabian trade of incense is well attested archaeologically. Numerous incense burners have been found in 
Mesopotamia for Achaemenid period. See (Avanzini, 1997) (Jasmin, 2005).
23 In Neo-Assyrian texts, the measurement of weight still lacks standardization, leading to a great deal of difficulties and 
errors, be they intentional or not. In Neo-Babylonian texts, the system is much simpler. We no longer find mention of 
the different terms which were abudant in Neo-Assyrian texts. (Powell, 1978). (Powell, 1990).
24 (Müller, 2004) gives several examples of additions of quantities expressed in minas which seem wrong to modern 
scholars. They have often been taken as a sign of the low calculation skills of the scribes, but may rather be the accurate
result, incomprehensible for us because of the complexity of the units of measure. 
25 (Joannès, 1994) (Vargyas, 2000) (Jursa, 2010, pp. 474–490).
26 The simplest way to check the silver finesse is to smell it, what obviously cannot happen for a very single transaction, 
and, anyway, requires a delay which wasn't not very convenient for every-day transactions. One can wonder if the 
manipulation  of  silver  was  not  self  evident.  This  Neo-Babylonian  contract  gives  an  idea  of  the
difficulties related to use of silver for some part of the population. 
21200 strings of onions owed by Marduk-šuma-ibni son of Nabû-ke-šìr, heir of Babutu to Nabu-
ušallim son of Inia, representing the business company harranū of Iddin-Marduk. Marduk-šuma-ibni will
deliver the onions by the 15th of the month of Nisan and [...].  Nabu-ušallim guarantees for the cutting-
up of the silver ingot of 87,5% fineness which is already at disposal of Marduk-šuma-ibni.  Nabu-
ušallim guarantees for the payment of thirty-one shekels of silver of 87,5% fineness. […]. 
 In this contract27, one of the parties, a local producer of some type of onion, requested that the
silver already given to him be cut by the businessman who was to buy his harvest. This uncommon
contract clause has been interpreted by M. Jursa28 as a sign that the seller, a rural farmer, did not know
how to cut a large piece of silver, and prefered to trust the buyer, a businessman better accustomed to
such a delicate task. 
The establishment of a more monetary economy was, nevertheless, an evolution which could
have reduced transaction costs. If we are to accept the conclusions of M. Jursa29, silver money becomes
increasingly used in transactions in the sixth century. This new economic tool lead to the development
of new, and maybe more productive, economic activities. M. Stolper was the first to demonstrate how
the increasing reliance on money, mostly for fiscal reasons, led to the development of entrepreneurial
activity by private businessmen acting on behalf of the palace or the temples30. As an example, the
Ebabbar temple of Sippar specialized in date grove exploitation.  The Babylonian evidence coming
from this temple is  numerous enough to allow quantitative studies  to appreciate  the nature of this
activity. The work was done by M. Jursa, who managed to estimate the date production on the temple
estates in a given time period31. His conclusions carry interesting lessons : the production of date fruits
by far exceeds the temple's needs : the temple administrators obviously calculated that it was better for
the temple to specialize in the production where they are the most efficient (economists would say
where there comparative advantage lies). They planed to exchange their surplus for money. Afterwhich
touchstone hasn't been used in VI th century Babylonia. The aban tasniqti “stone of verification” could refer to this 
touchstone, but the evidence is not clear enough for complete proof. Anyway, it seems that this touchstone was already 
in use in old Babylonian times. See (Le Rider & Chaunu, 2001) (Jursa, 2010, p. 476).
27 (Wunsch, 1993, no. 65).
28 (Jursa, 2010, p. 479).
29 Conclusions presented in (Jursa, 2010).
30 (Stolper, 1985)
31 (Jursa, 2010, pp. 572–573).
they used this money to buy commodities that they renounced to produce in the temple's estate. Such
arbitration is only possible in an at least partially monetarized economy. This monetary background
allowed the temple to specialize in the production of the goods that they produce the most efficiently32.
This  probably  allowed  for  higher  production  level  than  in  a  purely  self-supply  system.  In  this
perspective,  change  in  transaction  costs  allowed  new  economic  behavior,  and  increased  general
production. 
The legal  environment  is  the part  of transaction costs  factors  which has  received the most
attention  by  modern  economists33.  Contracts  and  legal  framework  facilitate  exchange  by  reducing
related risk. Mesopotamian evidence related to contracts is abundant34, and shows that changes occurs
in first  millennium BC. As a  sign,  the repertoire  of  pertinent  legal  formulae is  richer  in  the Neo-
Babylonian records than anywhere else in the Ancient Near East. The example of partnership contracts
is especially relevant. Babylonian partnership contracts are knonw already from the first half of the
second millennium BC. They were at this time phrased as simple loans, but included a statement that
the sum lent was placed at the debtor’s disposal for a business venture. This legal formulation remained
in use in the Neo-Babylonian period. However they were innovative procedures to be found especially
in the so-called harranū-contracts. The very name of those contracts refers to trade caravans, but their
purpose was larger : harranū-contract were basically a way to gather money, for whatever purpose35. In
most case, one person, the “investor,” loans money to another, the “agent”, who is expected to do
business with this capital. But M. Jursa has recently proved that this form of contract was subject to
legal innovation, under the influence of economic development of the Neo-Babylonian times36. At this
time examples  of true partnership appear, where two or  more partners  invest  the same amount  of
money and share the business work37. The regular contracts, used since the third millennium BC, were
basically a way to bring together capital and work. Neo-Babylonian innovation lies in the fact that
when both (or more) partners bring capital, the purpose is different : it is to raise more capital. M. Jursa
32 This is what economists call relative comparative advantage, following Ricardo. See (Laetitia Graslin-Thomé, 2009, 
p. 164)
33 NIE focuses on private solutions, saying that “in many instances, the participants can devise more satisfactory solutions 
to their disputes than can professional constrained to apply general rules on the basis of limited knowledge of the 
dispute” (Galanter, 1981, p. 4).
34 See, for example, (Wunsch, 2003). (Jursa, 2008)
35 (Lanz, 1976) (Wunsch, 2010, pp. 51–53)
36 (Jursa, 2008) (Jursa, 2009).
37 In some cases, one of the partner's invests less, but compensates by his work.
interpreted  them as  a  response to  a  new, much more  monetarized,  environment38.  Those contracts
allowed much more capital to be raised than classical mesopotamian contracts and allowed for larger
business ventures. 
Williamson payed special attention to the effects of transaction costs in modern economy, and
to the way to reduce them. This lead him to develop the theory of incomplete contracts39. This theory  is
part of NIE, in this way that its revises the assumption of perfectly rational decisions. It takes into
account  the  fact  described  by  H.  Simon  that  “boundedly  rational  agents  experience  limits  in
formulating  and  solving  complex  problems  and  in  processing  (receiving,  storing,  retrieving,
transmitting)  information”40.  According  to  Simon's  model,  economic  agents  have  only  a  partial
knowledge  and  understanding  of  their  economic  surroundings  :  they  are  not  able  to  foresee  how
economic context will change during the length of the contract. Due to their bounded rationality, agents
are not able to write contracts that specify the legal consequences in every possible state of the world.
It is therefore much more efficient to provide contracts which leave space for personal appreciation of
the parties. Their contracts are therefore incomplete contracts, with incentive effects rather than full
description of all possible cases.  
Neo-Babylonian evidence gives some examples of such incomplete contracts. The following
text is one of them : YOS VII 6341
15 mina's of silver, property of the temple of the lady of Uruk and of Nanai, is to be given to Iqīša
and Balāţu, as a capital for their travel to Transpotamia. In proportion to the consigment which they will
gather in Transpotamia, and will transport to Babylon, they will deliver to the temple Eanna (15 minas of
silver's worth of) white wine, white honey, copper, iron, tin, blue-purple wool and other necessities for
Eanna. 
This  contract  was concluded between the  temple's  administrators  and the  agents,  Iqīša  and
Balāţu  were commissioned  to  travel  long  distance,  in  Transpotamia,  to  bring  back  some  exotic
products.  Long  distance  trade  is  a  good  example  of  economic  activity  bearing  heavy  risk  and
38 Those contracts goes beyond the traditional investor-agent contracts known in previous times. They allow for a the
distinction between the company (and its capital) and the partners as ‘private individuals’ not that far from a business
company understood as a fully independent legal entity in its own right. As (Jursa, 2008) noticed, it is not surprising
that those new contracts arose at a time when private business increased.
39 Williamson’s transaction costs economy is a theory of contracts under conditions of uncertainty and asymmetric 
information, where legal enforcement and self enforcement complement each another. (Williamson, 2000).
40 (Simon, 1957).
41 (Oppenheim, 1969).
incertitude. Neither the prize nor the quality of goods can be foreseen at the moment of the departure.
There is therefore no other way than to leave the traveling agent free to judge what the best choice is,
once he reached the foreign market place. The contract concluded between temple and travelers is
therefore a typical incomplete contract. 
However Williamson warns us : those contracts are efficient because they leave the parties free
to  react  to  a  changing  economic  context.  But  they  are  also  dangerous,  by  allowing  opportunistic
behavior : one of the parties may try to manipulate the other one. For example one partner may keep
some useful information for himself, not saying that he could have bought commodities at a lower price
or of better quality for example. Ancient agents are aware of the risk of partner disloyalty involved in
incomplete contracts. In the same long distance trade context as the aforementioned text, this new one
(PTS  306842)  stipulates  that  the  delivery  will  not  be  accepted  and  the  money  given  back  if  the
consignment does not meet the temple's needs  :
Three mina's of silver, property of the lady of Uruk and Nanāja, price of twelve talents of
wool,  is  against  the  account  of  Ilu-rēšia-uşur,  servant  of  the  king.  According  to  the  temple's
requirement, he will pay gold, bronze and other trade goods to Eanna, as he will find them in
Meerland. In case the qīpu and the šatammu are not pleased with those trade goods, he will
give 3 minas of silver to Eanna. This is in addition to the earlier deficit owed by him. Done on
behalf of Mušezib-Marduk, qīpu of Eanna, Bānia, šatammu of Eanna, son of Tabnēa, of the Bā'iru
family.
Some texts  give  an  idea  of  strategies  used  by administrators  of  the  temples  to  ensure  the
reliability of their partners. In a text43, the capital given to the agent commissioned to travel abroad is
given in the form of a large house. This is a good way to ensure that the person entrusted with the
money will not disappear without having delivered the merchandise44, a strong risk in those business
transactions which involved traveling abroad. This measure however has its limits, as is demonstrated
elsewhere45: we learn in a text that the temple of Eanna had to initiate legal procedure to claim back a
house entrusted as capital for the commercial goods after ten years without getting neither the money
nor the shipment back. 
42 (Kleber, 2008, p. 327).
43 YOS XIX, 1. (Laetitia Graslin-Thomé, 2009, p. 51)
44 (Laetitia Graslin-Thomé, 2014b).
45 AnOr VIII 70. (Laetitia Graslin-Thomé, 2009, pp. 49–50)
In  the  modern  world,  when the  transaction  costs  of  coordinating  production  and exchange
through the market are too high because of imperfect information, Coase and Williamson46 explain that
a common answer is the emergence of firms. Those firms can take several aspects, such as franchise,
internal production instead of market use, take over of the supplier and cross share-holdings. All those
structures rely on the idea that it may be better to assume internal transaction costs than relying on a too
uncertain market. No firm or franchise existed of course in the ancient world, but the idea that internal
transactions are convenient to avoid the market incertitude is not unknown in ancient times. If we take,
once again, the example of the aformentionned text YOS VII 63, we can see those ideas in practice, for
a long distance trade context. It is not easy to answer the question regarding the status of the agents
commissioned by the temple to travel abroad to buy exotic goods abroad. It is difficult to decide if they
belong to temple staff, or if they were independent merchants concluding contracts with the temple47.
Nevertheless, the very existence of those contracts showed that the temple administrators sometimes
prefered to use personal contracts rather than relying on the market. 
If we want to go further in describing ancient Babylonian economy in NIE terms, we can notice
several  economic  structures  not  that  different  from  what  Williamson  and  NIE  economists  call
organizations, and interpret as a way to reduce transaction costs. This article does not intend to fully
investigate the comparison, but will limit itself to give several leading ideas. According to Williamson
and NIE economists, an organization is a group of individuals bound by some common purposes to
achieve economic objectives. Organizations include political, economic or social bodies. They are the
players of the game, while institutions are the rules of the game. They are designed to internalize
transaction costs, and to reduce the risks of dishonesty of the partners. Neo-Babylonian temples can be
considered as examples of such organizations : they had an abundant staff, ruled important estates and
herds48. Those means of production were ruled by administrators, even if Assyriologists still need to
investigate who exactly they were49 and how they took their economical decisions. Nevertheless, thanks
to the abundant evidence remaining from temple administrations, we have an idea of their strategies
and achievements. Recent studies, as example, have focused on the kind of bookkeeping held by those
administrations,  what  kind  of  economic  forecasting  they  allowed,  and what  their  economics  goals
46 (Coase, 1937)
47 On this subject, see (Laetitia Graslin-Thomé, 2009, pp. 393–401).
48 On Neo-Babylonian temples and their economic organization, see (Bongenaar, 1997) (Kleber, 2008) (Kleber, 2013).
49 (Jursa, 2013)
were50. In this case, to speak in NIE vocabulary, we have both the organization (the temple) and the
institutions (the rules and tools they can use).  
Other example of organizations in the sense of NIE can be found in private archives as well. A
well documented one is the example of the Egibis51, a famous family of entrepreneurs : the about 1700
clay tablets that have been recovered from their private archives are helping to reconstruct the complex
economic system that they managed to build. As tax farmers, they took control over the commodities
suppliers, and built a strong network, involving shipping, storage and food-processing. By the end, they
took control of the whole chain. We also know of the economic activities of a certain Iddin-Marduk 52,
thanks to approximately 400 preserved records that come from his personal archive : this business man
bought agricultural commodities from the local producers, and seld them in Babylon. He played a go-
between role between small rural cultivators and temples or state fiscal agents. His role was to convert
the crops to cash needed by local cultivators to pay their taxes. Numerous contracts founded in his
archives look like this one53 : 
1 mina of silver, in owed by Nergal-aha-iddin, son of Ahhē to Iddin-Marduk, son of Iqīša
heir of Nūr-Sin. At the month of Nisan (5th), he will pay tback the silver and the interest. This is in addition
to the earlier deficit owed by him.
Written before the harvest, this contract points out the amount of commodities to deliver, as
well as the price and the delivery location. In a way, it transforms what could have been a market
transaction into a contractual one. It is exactly what Williamson describes in his theory of the firm.
From the producers point of view also, those contracts are a response to their inability to sell their crop
by themselves. In a newly monetarised economy, they are required to pay their taxes in silver, but have
neither the opportunity nor the knowledge to find it by selling their crop by themselves. They therefore
have no other choice than to conclude contracts with a business man who was more familiar with the
economic system. The NIE explains non-market forms of organization as rational consequences of
market failures. The importance of such organizations in VIth century Babylonia may have indeed been
a sign of a incomplete market system.
50 (Jursa, 2004). (Laetitia Graslin-Thomé, 2014a). 
51 Their original trade in agricultural products became a large business, financed by harranu-contracts, connected with 
institutional actors. See (Wunsch, 2000) (Wunsch, 2007) (Wunsch, 2010).
52 (Wunsch, 1993) (Wunsch, 2010).
53 Nbn 943, (Wunsch, 1993, pp. 199–200)
Incomplete contracts, internalization of production or transactions to avoid transaction costs,
most economic facts described by NIE are to be found in ancient Mesopotamia as well. One question
nevertheless remains : does the use of NIE help to go further than a mere description, which would
have been possible without using economic models ? The position advocated in this paper is that it may
help to realize some paradoxes which deserve explanation. It also helps to draw attention to aspects that
could have been otherwise missed. Previous pages have described transformations in Neo-Babylonian
economy which impact the transaction costs. In an all too simple view of economic development, those
transformations should be quickly adopted by economic agents. Nevertheless, they often were not, or
incompletely. We have pointed out that despite evidence of camel use for long distance trade, this new
means of travel is never mentioned in babylonian business men's archives. Equally, silver money is
more commonly used, but not everywhere in the same way. We've seen above a text where one of the
parties obviously didn't feel confident enough with the use of this means of payment as he required his
partner for the cutting of the silver ingot : a modern economist would however tell him that paying in
silver is the easiest way to pay. This is not a isolated example : when actual coins began to arrive in
Babylonia, archaeological remains show that they were still cut as silver pieces54. To the great surprise
of modern economists, the local population didn't realize the economic benefits they could draw from
the introduction of coinage. 
All  those clues lead us in the same direction.  There were institutional changes, transactions
costs fell, and these sometimes allowed economic growth. However, their impact was more limited that
we could expect. To explain this paradox, it may be useful to read another economist belonging to the
NIE, D. North. This economist is probably the most famous NIE economist amount historians, because
he is the only one to have explicitly written on the impact of history on economic structures : historians
can only agree with his famous saying ¨history matters¨. He explains that institutional change can lower
transaction costs, and allow economic development. It is what usually holds historians attention. But
the second side of D. North's reasoning seems at least as important. If the institutions may lead to
economic  change,  other  institutions  may  prevent  it  from  happening.  In  most  NIE's  thought,
development is seen as a response to the evolution of institutions that support social and commercial
relationships. Economic growth thus depends on the degree to which the risky environment can be
54 Suchs coins are to be found in the so-called Rassam treasury, found in Babylon, dating from the Persian times. (Reade, 
1986) (Laëtitia Graslin-Thomé & Monerie, 2012).
controlled by institutions. Those institutions reduce information costs, encourage capital formation and
capital mobility. They also allow risks to be priced and shared and otherwise facilitate cooperation.
D. North, on the contrary, draws attention to the fact that institutions originally made to help economic
practices  are  sometime  still  in  place  at  a  time  when  they  are  no  longer  useful,  and  sometimes
counterproductive :  their very existence makes economic  activities more difficult and costly. This
phenomenon, where some decisions were limited by other decisions taken in the past, even though past
circumstances are no longer relevant, is called ¨path dependence¨. This fact, which has yet not been
fully explored by historians, could be a significant contribution of NIE to ancient economic history. 
According to D. North's definition, institutions can be formal like rules or laws, or informal like
customs, traditions or code of conduct55. Mentalities, social practices or interests of certain groups slow
down innovations that could benefit the society as a whole. In his most recent publication, D. North
draws attention to the mentalities and beliefs, and to the role they play in this path-dependence : legal
institutions changes have no effect if the shared mental models and beliefs of the population do not
change themselves. They are crucial points to understand how people may accept or reject a possible
evolution :  ¨in order to understand decision making under such conditions of uncertainty we must
understand the relationship between the mental models that individuals construct to make sense out of
the world around them, the ideologies that evolve from such constructions, and the institutions that
develop in a society to order interpersonal relationships¨56. This is furthermore important in history that
the mental structures tend to change considerably slower than legal framework.
From a historian point's of view, this emphasis put on the importance of the mental models of
individuals is relevant to describe the mental rigidities which restrict economic change. Recent research
in Neo-Babylonian economy draws attention on mentalities, and on their consequences on economic
behavior.  M. Jursa recently described57 two different kinds of economic behavior that he called the
¨rentier type¨ and the ¨entrepreneur type¨.  Most Neo-Babylonian archives belong to ¨rentier¨ families :
their members sought to obtain a reliable income from mostly inherited positions and resources. Most
55 According to D. North, institutions are “humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social 
interactions. They can be both formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights) and informal restraints (sanctions, 
taboos, customs, traditions, code of conduct), which usually contribute to the perpetuation of order and safety within a 
market or society”. (North, 1990, p. 3).
56 (D. North & Denzau, 1994). The mental models are, according to North and Denzau, “the internal representation that 
individual cognitive systems create to interpret the environment”.
57 (Jursa, 2010) (Jursa, 2009).
of their economic activities were related to the exploitation of prebends and landed property. Those
kind  of  economic  agents  obviously  avoided  the  risk  and  the  new  economic  activities.  Temple
administrators behaved in the same way. We have shown for example that they were reluctant to take
part  in long distance trade and prefer to  deal with agents bound by contracts.  Their  compatibility,
known  through  their  numerous  archives,  is  rudimentary  despite  the  enormous  amount  of  tablets
produced : it is designed to control the temple staff and avoid misappropriation of goods, not to plan an
economic strategy58. A few archives show a different kind of economic behavior. The Egibi family, or
the  aforementioned  Iddin-Marduk,  are  examples  of  Jursa's  “entrepreneur  type”59.  They  tended  to
engage in  a  highly profitable  but  also risky venture business  on taking profit  from the increasing
monetarization of the economy. One of their main activity was to organize the flow of commodities and
silver  transfers  between cultivators and large institutions,  temples,  palaces or people related to the
crown. Their economic activities were strongly related to palaces and temples. They made profit from
their  relationships  with  the  crown  to  be  awarded  farming  contracts  or  tax  exemption  to  use
transportation means60.Their social status depended, at the same time, on their relationship with those
preeminent institutions. They often bought prebends, to be integrated into the local notability related to
temples.  The  close  relationship  between  the  so-called  entrepreneurs  and  the  institutional  sector  of
economy  (temple  or  palace),  evidenced  throughout  our  texts,  shifts  their  economic  activities  and
innovation abilities toward temple and crown. It may have led them to ignore other economic tasks.
This relative disinterest on outer economic fields could be part of the explanation of the fact that Neo-
Babylonian business men obviously missed the opportunity of long distance trade development. 
This article tried to apply some of the NIE conclusions to the study of ancient Neo-Babylonian
economy. The transaction cost theory helps to take into account several aspects that play a role in
economic change at this time : transport costs do not change a significantly way, but legal innovations
in business contracts allow new business activities, on a large scale, as they make possible it to raise a
higher level of capital than before. Nevertheless, the economic system is still imperfect, and we have in
Neo-Babylonian times evidence of several economic structures which are labeled by NIE economists
58 (Jursa, 2004) (Laetitia Graslin-Thomé, 2014a).
59 (Laetitia Graslin-Thomé & Vivel, 2005).
60 (Wunsch, 2010).
as  a  way  to  circumvent  an  unsatisfying  market  :  incomplete  contracts,  organizations  trying  to
internalize exchange instead of relying on the market were common in Neo-Babylonian times. Finally,
it seems that historians have to take into account the newest development of NIE theory, which draws
attention to the institutional rigidities which may restrict economic change. Bounded rationally of the
agents, and, furthermore, mentalities are to be taken into account for an accurate understanding of
modern and ancient economies. In some way, economic theory and history seems to converge on the
same kind of interests. Thanks to its more nuanced view of economic reality, the NIE provide historians
with models that are   more useful in  describing ancient facts  than former economic systems. And
actually, most of the facts that they highlight can also be found in ancient economy. It also helps to
overcome the old debate between the tenants of a market or non-market economy in ancient times.
Thus, NIE is particularly useful for historians, as it argues against a too “market-oriented” view of
modern economies, a theoretical choice what is evermore true in ancient times. It encourages focus on
institutional change and on mentalities, seen as an economic variable. NIE helps to ask the question of
economic growth in antiquity in a more subtle way than previous research : technological change is not
the only factor which has to be taken into account. Institutions can both accelerate or restrict economic
change, mentalities and value system must not be put apart of economic explanations. In this sense,
NIE gives a theoretical framework to explanations that have already been given by historians, to help
form a fully coherant system. On the other hand, NIE is a good way for economists to have access to
precise and up-to-date historical evidence, that could, in return, be fruitful for their own modelisation.
But in this aspect, much work remains to be done.
Adams, R. M. (1981).  Heartland of cities: Surveys of ancient settlement and land use on the central
floodplain of the Euphrates (Vols. 1-1). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Archibald, Z. H., Davies, J. K., & Gabrielsen, V. (Eds.). (2005).  Making, moving and managing: the
new world of ancient economies, 323-31 BC. Oxford: Oxbow Books.
Avanzini, A. (Ed.). (1997). Profumi d’Arabia: atti del convegno. Roma: “L’Erma” di Bretschneider.
Bang, P. (2009). The ancient Economy and New Institutional Economics. Journal of Roman Studies, 99
(pp. 194-206).
Bongenaar, A. C. V. M. (1997). The neo-Babylonian Ebabbar temple at Sippar: its administration and
its prosopography (Vols. 1-1). Istanbul: Nederlands historisch-archaelogisch Instituut.
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J.-C. Paris: De Boccard.
Graslin-Thomé,  L.  (2014a).  Archivage  et  comptabilité  en  Babylonie  au  VIe  siècle  av.  J.-C.
Comptabilités.
Graslin-Thomé, L. (2014b). Les marchands mésopotamiens et la théorie des jeux. In Z. Csabai (Ed.),
Studies in economic and social history of the Ancient Near East in Memory of Péter Vargyas
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199). Paris.
Grayson, A. K. (1991). The Royal inscriptions of Mesopotamia. Toronto.
Jasmin, M. (2005). Les conditions d’émergence de la route de l’encens à la fin du IIieme millénaire.
Syria, 82, (pp. 49–62).
Joannès, F. (1994). Métaux précieux et moyens de paiement en babylonie achéménide et hellénistique.
Transeuphratène, 8, (pp. 137–144).
Joannès, F. (2004). The Age of empires: Mesopotamia in the first millennium BC. (A. Nevill, Trans.).
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Jursa, M. (2004). Accounting in Neo-Babylonian Institutional Archives: Structure, Usage, Implications.
In C. Wunsch & Hudson (Eds.),  Creating Economic Order. Record-keeping, Standardization,
and the Development of Accounting in the Ancient Near East (pp. 145–198). Bethesda, (pp.
145-198). 
Jursa,  M.  (2005).  Neo-Babylonian  legal  and  administrative  documents:  typology,  contents,  and
archives (Vols. 1-1). Münster: Ugarit-Verlag.
Jursa, M. (2008). Economic change and legal innovation. On Aspects of commercial interaction and
land tenure in Babylonia in first millennium BC. In M. Liverani & C. Mora (Eds.), Diritti del
mondo cuneiformo (Mesopotamia e regione adiacenci ca 2500-500 a. C.) (pp. 601–628).
Jursa,  M.  (2009).  Business  companies  in  Babylonia  in  first  millennium BC:  structures,  economic
strategies,  social  settins.  In  M.  Wissa  (Ed.),  The  knowledge  economy  and  technological
capabilities: Egypt, the Near East and the Mediterranean 2nd millennium B.C. - 1st millennium
A.D. (pp. 53–68). Sabadell: Editorial Ausa.
Jursa, M. (2010). Aspects of the economic history of Babylonia in the first Millennium BC: economic
geography, economic mentalities, agriculture, the use of money and the problem of economic
growth (Vols. 1-1). Münster: Ugarit-Verlag.
Jursa, M. (2013). Die babylonische priesterschaft im ersten Jahrtausend v. Chr. In  Tempel im Alten
Orient:  7.  Internationales  Colloquium  der  Deutschen  Orient-Gesellschaft,  11.-13.  Oktober
2009, München (pp. 151–166). Wiesbaden.
Kleber, K. (2008). Tempel und Palast: Die Beziehungen zwischen dem König und dem Eanna-Tempel
im spätbabylonischen Uruk (Vols. 1-1). Münster: Ugarit-Verlag.
Kleber, K. (2013). The late babylonian temple: economiy politics and cult. In Tempel im Alten Orient:
7.  Internationales  Colloquium  der  Deutschen  Orient-Gesellschaft,  11.-13.  Oktober  2009,
München (pp. 167–178). Wiesbaden.
Lanz, H. (1976). Die babylonischen harranu Gesellschaft-unternehmen. Berlin.
Le Rider, G., & Chaunu, P. (2001).  La naissance de la monnaie: pratiques monétaires de l’Orient
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